Violence Has Declined in Northern Ireland Because Terrorist Organizations

Violence Has Declined in Northern Ireland Because Terrorist Organizations

INTRODUCTION

Public condom personnel are often positioned to identify suspicious activeness potentially related to terrorism, and in some cases, showtime responders who have reported this information have helped to disrupt terrorist plans or attacks in the United states of america.
JCAT’S COUNTERTERRORISM GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL
is designed to aid first responders in:


  • RECOGNIZING
    and
    REPORTING
    suspicious activity that may be linked to terrorism, consistent with the Nationwide Suspicious Action Reporting (SAR) Initiative;

  • SPOTTING
    indicators of mobilization to violence; and,

  • RESPONDING
    to and
    MITIGATING
    terrorist attacks.


THE GUIDE IS DERIVED FROM EXISTING UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES.


COUNTERTERRORISM

PARTNERS = ENHANCED

INFORMATION SHARING

FBI logo

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES (JTTFs)
serve every bit the coordinated “activeness arms” for federal, land, and local government response to terrorism threats in specific US geographic regions. The FBI is the lead agency that oversees JTTFs. The benefits of a JTTF include:

  • “One-stop shopping” for law enforcement data or investigation of suspected or real terrorist activities
  • Use of a shared intelligence base
  • Ability to prosecute cases in the jurisdiction that is virtually efficient and effective
  • Job force member awareness of investigations inside a jurisdiction and ability to assistance in investigations in other jurisdictions
  • Familiarity amid agencies, investigators, and managers before a crunch occurs

The mission of a JTTF is to leverage the commonage resources of the member agencies for the prevention, preemption, deterrence, and investigation of terrorist acts that affect US interests, to disrupt and prevent terrorist acts, and to apprehend individuals who may commit or plan to commit such acts. To further this mission, a JTTF serves as a means to facilitate data sharing amongst JTTF members.

FUSION CENTERS
are defined as a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to notice, foreclose, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorism activity
(Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006). The fusion centers are owned and operated by country and local governments with support from federal partners. Although fusion centers predate the nine/11 terrorist attacks, the concept gained momentum and was promoted by state and local law enforcement and homeland security officials during mail-nine/11 discussions as a more than constructive way to protect their communities.


TERRORIST ATTACK
PLANNING CYCLE

Understanding the terrorist attack planning cycle can assist starting time responders and public prophylactic personnel recognize preoperational activities. Terrorists mostly plan attacks in observable stages, although specific details, sequencing, and timing can vary profoundly and change over time. Preattack surveillance, training, and rehearsals are the stages of the planning bike that are oft appreciable and can offering opportunities to identify plots and preclude attacks.

graphic of terrorist attack planning cycle showing how attack stages are not linear. Stages include: Broad target consideration, Intelligence gathering and surveillance, training, attack rehersal/dry runs, preattack surveillance, and specific target selection


REPORTING SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITY


“WHETHER A PLAN FOR A TERRORIST ATTACK IS HOMEGROWN OR ORIGINATES OVERSEAS, Of import Noesis THAT MAY FOREWARN OF A FUTURE ATTACK MAY BE DERIVED FROM Data GATHERED BY Country, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL Government PERSONNEL IN THE Grade OF ROUTINE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES.”


NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING OCTOBER 2007

THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING (SAR) INITIATIVE (NSI)
is a joint collaborative effort past DHS, FBI, and state, local, tribal, and territorial constabulary enforcement partners. This initiative provides police enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and other related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR information.

Online SAR Training for Law Enforcement and Hometown Security Partners: the NSI training strategy is a multifaceted approach designed to increase the effectiveness of state, local, and tribal law enforcement and public rubber professionals and other frontline partners in identifying, reporting, evaluating, and sharing preincident terrorism indicators to prevent acts of terrorism. The SAR Line Officeholder Training and each sector-specific SAR Hometown Security Partners Training discuss how to report identified suspicious activity to the proper authorities while maintaining the protection of citizens’ privacy, ceremonious rights, and civil liberties.

Online training is available on the NSI website (http://nsi.ncirc.gov/training_online.aspx) and includes:

  • Scenarios that illustrate the benefit and importance of SAR
  • Descriptions of SAR-related behaviors and indicators
  • A document of completion


INDICATORS OF SUSPICIOUS

Activeness

ONE OR More than OF THESE INDICATORS COULD SIGNAL SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY, ALTHOUGH EACH State of affairs MUST Exist INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATED. WHEN THE BEHAVIOR OR Activity INVOLVES BEHAVIORS THAT MAY Exist LAWFUL OR IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED Activeness, THE INVESTIGATING LAW ENFORCEMENT Agency WILL CAREFULLY ASSESS THE INFORMATION AND Assemble Equally MUCH Information AS POSSIBLE BEFORE TAKING Any Activity, INCLUDING DOCUMENTING AND VALIDATING THE INFORMATION AS TERRORISM-RELATED AND SHARING It WITH OTHER Law ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

POTENTIAL CRIMINAL OR NONCRIMINAL ACTIVITIES REQUIRING Boosted Data DURING INVESTIGATION


ELICITING INFORMATION:

Questioning individuals at a level beyond mere marvel virtually particular facets of a facility’southward or building’south purpose, operations, security procedures, etc., that would agitate suspicion in a reasonable person.


TESTING OF SECURITY:

Interactions with or challenges to installations, personnel, or systems that reveal physical, personnel, or cyber security capabilities.

  • Unscheduled deliveries of materials or equipment.
  • Unattended or unauthorized vessels or vehicles in unusual or restricted areas.
  • Overt testing of security measures or emergency response.


RECRUITING:

Building operations teams and contacts, personnel information, banking data, or travel information.


OBSERVATION/SURVEILLANCE:

Demonstrating unusual attention to facilities, buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual or professional (e.g., engineers) interest such that a reasonable person would consider the activity suspicious. Examples include observation through binoculars, taking notes, or attempting to measure distances.


PHOTOGRAPHY:

Taking photos or videos of facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in a questionable way that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person. Examples include taking pictures or video of infrequently used access points, personnel performing security functions (patrols, badge/vehicle checking), or security-related equipment (perimeter fencing, security cameras), etc. All reporting should be done inside the totality of the circumstances.


MATERIALS Acquisition/STORAGE:

Procurement of unusual quantities of possible IED materials, such as cellphones, pagers, fuel, or timers, and/or explosive precursors, such every bit fertilizers, fuels, or acids, such that a reasonable person would suspect possible criminal action.

  • Hidden, disguised, or unusual storage of:
  • » Laboratory equipment—Bunsen burners, lab stands, and scientific glassware.
    » Personal protective equipment—masks, goggles, and gloves.
    » Household items—strainers, coffee grinders, and filters.
    » Common household chemicals—acetone, peroxide, and sulphuric acid (e.g. drain cleaner).

  • Attempted purchase of controlled materials without proper credentials.
  • Attempted purchase of controlled or hazardous materials in bulk quantities.
  • Presence of potential precursors for chemical or biological agent production.
  • Private has fiddling cognition of intended buy items.
  • Possession of instructions to create potentially harmful devices, chemicals, or agents.


Acquisition OF EXPERTISE OR CAPABILITY:

Attempts to obtain or carry training in security concepts (military weapons or tactics) or other unusual capabilities that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person.

  • Interest in using or modifying technology for uses exterior of intended purpose.


WEAPONS DISCOVERY:

Discovery of unusual amounts of weapons or explosives that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person.

  • Discovery of homemade explosive precursor, such as fertilizers, strong acids, peroxides, and solvents.
  • Discovery of chemic or biological precursors, such as anhydrous ammonia, sulfur, castor beans, acetone, and Epsom salt.
  • Items found onsite that do not vest or otherwise seem out of identify.
  • Burn marks or discoloration on walls, doors, ground, and/or flooring; presence of unusual odors or liquids.
  • Unusual or unpleasant odors, chemic fires, brightly colored stains, or corroded or rusted metal fixtures in otherwise dry and weather-protected environments.
  • Chemical burns on hands or body, chemical bleaching of pare or pilus.
  • Injuries or illness inconsistent with explanation.


SECTOR-SPECIFIC INCIDENT:

Actions associated with a feature of unique business organization to specific sectors (such as the public wellness sector) with regard to their personnel, facilities, systems, or functions.


Breach/ATTEMPTED INTRUSION:

Unauthorized personnel attempting to enter or actually entering a restricted area or protected site. Impersonation of authorized personnel (e.g., police/security, janitor).

  • Access bluecoat sharing and “piggy backing” at security gates and doors.
  • Seeking additional access to or encountered inside restricted or controlled areas.
  • Attempting to acquire official vehicles, uniforms, identification, and admission cards.


MISREPRESENTATION:

Presenting imitation or misusing insignia, documents, and/or identification to misrepresent one’s amalgamation to comprehend possible illicit activeness.

  • Refusal to provide all required information when completing paperwork.
  • Forged or altered identification.
  • Use of fraudulent documents (oft referred to as “breeder” documents), which may be used to obtain official documents, including birth/death certificates, drivers licenses, and passports.


THEFT/LOSS/DIVERSION:

Stealing or diverting something associated with a facility/infrastructure (e.thou., badges, uniforms, identification, emergency vehicles, technology, or documents [classified or unclassified]) that are proprietary to the facility.

  • Hazardous materials or controlled substances.


Demolition/TAMPERING/VANDALISM:

Damaging, manipulating, or defacing part of a facility/infrastructure or protected site.


CYBER Attack:

Compromising or attempting to compromise or disrupt an organization’due south it infrastructure.


EXPRESSED OR Unsaid THREAT:

Communicating a spoken or written threat to harm or compromise a facility/infrastructure.

  • Against the US or individuals.


AVIATION Activity:

Operation of an aircraft in a manner that reasonably may be interpreted every bit suspicious or posing a threat to people or property. This activity may or may not be in violation of Federal Aviation Regulations.


PRECURSORS OF VIOLENT
EXTREMISM

AT THE State AND LOCAL LEVEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO STEMMING HOMEGROWN Vehement EXTREMISM, INCLUDES THE LOCAL Customs AND ITS Kickoff RESPONDERS.

Communities are an integral part of the effort to prevent tearing extremism and tin can aid law enforcement in identifying at-risk individuals. Awareness and vigilance are crucial to place behaviors that tin lead to a violent human action. Several behaviors, when taken in context, can indicate radicalized individuals are mobilizing—preparing to engage in violence to accelerate their cause. These behaviors include seeking out training, building adequacy, and other preparatory behaviors. The beneath factors drive the mobilization procedure and may interact to mobilize individuals toward violence. A lack of access to some or all of these factors may crusade some individuals to back away from violence or result in individuals changing their plans.


READINESS TO Human activity:

Individual motivation and intent that keeps the person engaged and moving toward his or her intended goal. Readiness to act can vary across time and be influenced past multiple factors—including personal will and competence, experiences while in preparation, and motivation gained or lost every bit a event of established relationships.


OPPORTUNITY:

Access to training and resource that provide individuals or groups the chance to take action. This can range from target exercise at a local firing range to explosives training with terrorists overseas. Opportunity can besides include having available time to engage in violent activities.


Adequacy:

Training that has prepared an private to follow through on his or her intentions. The individual’south capability also includes his or her educational training and skill set acquired through life experiences.


TARGETS:

Locations that the individual is familiar with because of where he or she lives or works or is interested in because of what they stand for, such as supposed economic, political, or military dominance by the West.

FBI and DHS both maintain web portals which contain Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) training resources, hundreds of the most electric current CVE training materials, case studies, analytical products, and other resources, including preincident indicators.

For additional information, please visit DHS.GOV (http://world wide web.dhs.gov/topic/countering-violent-extremism), or the FBI-Countering Tearing Extremism Office (FBI-CVEO) special interest group on FBI’s Police Enforcement Enterprise Portal (http://www.leo.gov), which house intelligence products, behavioral indicators, bookish studies, and behavioral models to assist the understanding of fierce extremism.


TERRORIST TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,

AND PROCEDURES (TTPS)

THE FOLLOWING List, WHILE Not COMPREHENSIVE, PROVIDES Sensation OF SELECT TTPS
THAT Starting time RESPONDERS MAY ENCOUNTER Every bit A PRETEXT TO, IN Advance OF, OR DURING CALLS FOR SERVICE.

Utilize OF SECONDARY EXPLOSIVE DEVICES TO TARGET Offset RESPONDERS AND ONLOOKERS:


SECONDARY EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ATTACK TACTICS:

  • After an initial set on, terrorists may endeavor to target outset responders and onlookers by detonating a second explosive device in or around the anticipated rubber area or evacuation locations..
  • Terrorists can conduct secondary attacks past infiltrating suicide bombers into crowds of bystanders or by detonating preset bombs remotely through the use of timers, remote triggers, or motion sensors.
  • These explosive devices may be concealed in innocuous items of various sizes, such equally vehicles, backpacks, garbage cans, mail boxes, and planters.


CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF THREATS, EVACUATION OF HAZARDOUS AREAS, AND NOTIFICATION OF THE BOMB SQUAD:

  • Secondary devices may be found in any configuration, not limited to the primary set on method.
  • Maintain awareness of possible remote initiation or fill-in timer on any improvised explosive device.

TERRORIST IMPERSONATION OF FIRST RESPONDERS: Employ of commandeered or fake Emergency Services Sector (ESS) Items could:

  • Be used to gain access to secure sites.
  • Be used to comport a secondary assail.
  • Create more victims, including first responders already on scene.
  • Potentially impact response times and delay genuine emergency responders.
  • Allow access for individuals to conduct surveillance or collect data.

SWATTING:
Making a hoax ix-1-1 call to describe a response from kickoff responders. Swatting includes spoofing or masking Caller ID information, which is legal, simple to use, and used past many businesses. There are no means bachelor to chop-chop, accurately, and inexpensively identify swatting calls, so there is little selection but to dispatch resource.

DIVERSION:
Tactic used to draw first responders away from the intended main target of an attack and may be used equally part of a complex or multipronged attack:


POSSIBLE INDICATORS OF DIVERSION TACTICS:

  • Similar responses or suspicious activities (e.g., hoax devices or bomb threats) in multiple locations throughout the jurisdiction that disperse avails.
  • Multiple responses requiring specialized or technical equipment that reduces resources.
  • A significant incident or several minor incidents that require a commitment of resources to investigate or mitigate.
  • Unusually high number of calls for service or incidence of activities inconsistent with typical patterns within the area of responsibility.


BEST PRACTICES IN PROTECTING FROM DIVERSIONS:

  • Establish acceleration policies designed to concord resources in reserve (tiered responses).
  • Provide situational updates to first responders to enhance safe.
  • Ensure regular notifications to interagency partners and neighboring jurisdictions to provide shared operational film of possible diversionary attacks.
  • Plan and train for identified vulnerabilities.

Employ OF STOLEN, CLONED, OR REPURPOSED VEHICLES:
Cloned vehicles have been modified to resemble an accurate vehicle, and repurposed vehicles are authentic vehicles that are no longer in official service. These vehicles are typically decommissioned by departments and are publicly available for buy at auctions or on the Internet:

  • The commuter or vehicle destination and origin are inconsistent with the company or service being represented.
  • The driver is not knowledgeable nearly the company or its service.
  • The driver has no uniform or has one that is inconsistent with the vehicle’s advertised business organization.
  • Vehicle registration and insurance are in named individual instead of company.
  • Vehicle make, model, and yr may not match company’s electric current fleet.
  • Multiple or conflicting corporate names and logos appear on the same vehicle.
  • Visible identifiers, such as phone numbers, license plates, or call numbers that are inconsistent with the vehicle’s operating area or mission.
  • The time of twenty-four hours or location of vehicle that is inconsistent with its purpose.
  • The vehicle appears to be heavily loaded, possibly beyond capacity.

MEDICAL DISCOVERY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY AT THE SCENE OF A REQUEST FOR SERVICE:
Starting time responder scene size up, when combined with the totality of information received from victims, witnesses, and bystanders, offers the risk to appraise whether an incident is potentially related to terrorism. Kickoff responders should remain openminded while performing medical and trauma assessments. Hastily or expediently treated injuries may be an indicator of suspicious activity, as those injured may not seek immediate medical intendance or apply efforts to obscure the true nature of the injury.

  • Trauma assessments: Explosions tin can issue in unique injury patterns involving penetrating wounds, blunt trauma, amputations/avulsions and burns, as well every bit the possibility of “blast-lung.” Chemical burns from contact will vary depending on the chemical type and length of exposure, while inhalation and ingestion may present a rapid onset of signs and symptoms.
  • Medical assessments: Small-scale or rudimentary production of biological warfare agents may event in inadvertent human exposures, particularly amidst poorly trained or novice scientists working with homemade laboratory equipment. Sudden onset of symptoms may assist in determining exposure to chemical or biological agents. Multiple patients with similar chemical/biological exposure symptoms at whatever incident may exist an indicator of suspicious activity and unexpected infections with nonendemic agents without verifiable travel exposure or unusual clusters of cases should prompt further investigation.


POSTBLAST BUILDING Assessment

During a postblast building assessment, conisder looking for the post-obit:

  • Plummet, partial collapse, or building off foundation
  • Building/story noticeably leaning
  • Severe cracking of walls, obvious severe damage and distress
  • Ceilings, lite fixtures, or other nonstructural hazards
  • HazMat spills
  • Stress fracture
  • Bulging walls
  • Sagging ceilings
  • Other hazard nowadays


WARNING: Practice not enter any building structure unless fully trained and equipped for postblast hazards.


FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

AL-QA‘IDA

  • Al-Qaida flag


  • AL-QA‘IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
    (AQAP)

  • Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula flag


  • AL-QA‘IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB
    (AQIM)

  • Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb flag


  • AL-NUSRAH Front

  • Al-Nusrah Front flag


  • AL-MURABITUN

  • Al-Murabitun flag


  • AL-SHABAAB
    (HARAKAT SHABAAB AL-MUJAHIDIN)

  • Al-Shabaab flag


  • ISLAMIC STATE OF Iraq AND ASH-SHAM
    (ISIS),

    FORMERLY KNOWN AS AL-QA‘IDA IN IRAQ
    (AQI)

  • ISIS flag


  • ABU SAYYAF Group
    (ASG)

  • Abu Sayyaf Group flag


  • ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS(ABM)

  • ABM flag


  • BOKO HARAM

  • Boko Haram flag


  • CONTINUITY Irish gaelic REPUBLICAN Ground forces(CIRA)


  • HAMAS

  • Hamas flag


  • IMIRAT KAVKAZ
    (IK OR CAUCASUS EMIRATE)

  • Imirat Kavakaz flag


  • JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD
    (JEM)

  • Jaish-e-mohammad flag


  • JEMAAH ANSHORUT TAUHID
    (JAT)

  • Jemaah Anshorut flag


  • JEMAAH ISLAMIYA
    (JI)

  • Jemaah Islamiya flag


  • KURDISTAN PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OR KONGRA-GEL
    (KGK)

  • Kongra-Gel flag


  • LASHKAR-Eastward-TAYYIBA
    (LT)

  • Lashkar-e-tayyiba flag

Violence Has Declined in Northern Ireland Because Terrorist Organizations

Source: https://www.dni.gov/nctc/jcat/index.html

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