After the Great Depression France Could Best Be Described as

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worldwide depression struck countries with market economies at the cease of the 1920s. Although the Great Depression was relatively balmy in some countries, it was astringent in others, particularly in the United States, where, at its nadir in 1933, 25 percent of all workers and 37 percent of all nonfarm workers were completely out of work. Some people starved; many others lost their farms and homes. Homeless vagabonds sneaked aboard the freight trains that crossed the nation. Dispossessed cotton farmers, the “Okies,” blimp their possessions into dilapidated Model Ts and migrated to California in the faux hope that the posters most plentiful jobs were truthful. Although the U.S. economy began to recover in the second quarter of 1933, the recovery largely stalled for most of 1934 and 1935. A more vigorous recovery commenced in late 1935 and connected into 1937, when a new depression occurred. The American economic system had yet to fully recover from the Corking Depression when the The states was fatigued into Globe State of war II in December 1941. Because of this agonizingly slow recovery, the entire decade of the 1930s in the Usa is often referred to as the Keen Depression.

The Great Low is often chosen a “defining moment” in the twentieth-century history of the U.s.. Its most lasting effect was a transformation of the role of the federal authorities in the economic system. The long contraction and painfully irksome recovery led many in the American
population
to have and even call for a vastly expanded role for authorities, though most businesses resented the growing federal control of their activities. The federal government took over responsibility for the elderly population with the cosmos of
Social Security
and gave the involuntarily unemployed
unemployment
compensation. The Wagner Act dramatically changed labor negotiations between employers and employees by promoting unions and interim equally an arbiter to ensure “fair” labor contract negotiations. All of this required an increase in the size of the federal regime. During the 1920s, in that location were, on average, near 553,000 paid civilian employees of the federal government. By 1939 there were 953,891 paid civilian employees, and at that place were one,042,420 in 1940. In 1928 and 1929, federal receipts on the authoritative budget (the administrative upkeep excludes any amounts received for or spent from trust funds and any amounts borrowed or used to pay downward the debt) averaged 3.80 percent of GNP while expenditures averaged 3.04 percent of GNP. In 1939, federal receipts were 5.fifty percent of GNP, while federal expenditures had tripled to nine.77 percentage of GNP. These figures provide an indication of the vast expansion of the federal government’south part during the depressed 1930s.

The Smashing Depression also inverse economic thinking. Because many economists and others blamed the depression on inadequate need, the Keynesian view that regime could and should stabilize demand to prevent hereafter depressions became the ascendant view in the economic science profession for at to the lowest degree the side by side forty years. Although an increasing number of economists have come to doubt this view, the general public still accepts it.

Interestingly, given the importance of the Nifty Low in the development of economic thinking and economic policy, economists do not completely concur on what caused it. Recent research by Peter Temin, Barry Eichengreen, David Glasner, Ben Bernanke, and others has led to an emerging consensus on why the wrinkle began in 1928 and 1929. There is less understanding on why the contraction phase was longer and more severe in some countries and why the depression lasted and so long in some countries, especially the U.s..

The Great Depression that began at the stop of the 1920s was a worldwide phenomenon. Past 1928, Germany, Brazil, and the economies of Southeast Asia were depressed. By early 1929, the economies of Poland, Argentina, and Canada were contracting, and the U.S. economic system followed in the centre of 1929. As Temin, Eichengreen, and others have shown, the larger factor that tied these countries together was the international
aureate standard.

By 1914, most developed countries had adopted the gold standard with a stock-still commutation rate between the national currency and gold—and therefore between national currencies. In World War I, European nations went off the gold standard to impress money, and the resulting price
aggrandizement
drove big amounts of the world’southward gilded to banks


in the United states. The United States remained on the gold standard without altering the gold value of the dollar. Investors and others who held aureate sent their gold to the The states, where gold maintained its value every bit a safety and sound
investment. At the finish of World State of war I, a few countries, most notably the Usa, continued on the gold standard while others temporarily adopted floating substitution rates. The globe’s international finance centre had shifted from London to New York Metropolis, and the British were anxious to regain their old status. Some countries pledged to return to the gold standard with devalued currencies, while others followed the British lead and aimed to return to gilded at prewar substitution rates.

This was not possible, however. Too much coin had been created during the war to allow a return to the gilt standard without either large currency devaluations or cost deflations. In addition, the U.S. gold stock had doubled to about 40 per centum of the world’s budgetary gold. There simply was not enough monetary gold in the rest of the globe to support the countries’ currencies at the existing exchange rates. Every bit a consequence, the leading nations established a aureate exchange system whereby the governments of the United States and Neat United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland would exist willing, at all times, to redeem the dollar and the pound for gold, and other countries would hold much of their international reserves in British pounds or U.Southward. dollars.

The demand for gold increased as countries returned to the gold standard. Because the franc was undervalued when French republic returned to the gold standard in June 1928, France began to receive gilded inflows. The undervalued franc fabricated French exports less expensive in foreign countries’ currencies and made foreign imports into France more expensive in francs. As French exports rose and French imports savage, their international accounts were balanced past aureate shipped to French republic. France’southward government, contrary to the tenets of the gold standard, did not utilise these inflows to expand its
money supply. In 1928, the
Federal Reserve Organisation
raised its disbelieve charge per unit—that is, the rate it charged on loans to member banks—in order to raise
interest rates
in the United States, which would stem the outflow of American gold and dampen the booming
stock market. As a result, the United states of america began to receive shipments of gold. Past 1929, as countries effectually the world lost golden to France and the The states, these countries’ governments initiated deflationary policies to stem their gilt outflows and remain on the gold standard. These deflationary policies were designed to restrict economic activeness and reduce price levels, and that is exactly what they did. Thus began the worldwide Bang-up Depression.

The onset of the contraction led to the finish of the stockmarket nail and the crash in tardily October 1929. However, the stock market collapse did not crusade the low; nor can it explain the boggling length and depth of the American contraction. In nigh countries, such every bit Britain, France, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries, the low was less astringent and shorter, often catastrophe by 1931. Those countries did not have the banking and fiscal crises that the Usa did, and most left the aureate standard before than the Usa did. In the U.s.a., in contrast, the contraction continued for four years from the summer of 1929 through the first quarter of 1933. During that time real GNP savage 30.5 percent, wholesale prices fell 30.8 percent, and consumer prices roughshod 24.4 percent.

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In previous depressions, wage rates typically barbarous nine-x percent during a i- to 2-year wrinkle; these falling wages made information technology possible for more workers than otherwise to proceed their jobs. Even so, in the Not bad Depression, manufacturing firms kept wage rates nearly constant into 1931, something commentators considered quite unusual. With falling prices and constant wage rates, real hourly wages rose sharply in 1930 and 1931. Though some spreading of work did occur, firms primarily laid off workers. As a result, unemployment began to soar amid plummeting product, peculiarly in the durable manufacturing sector, where production fell 36 percentage betwixt the end of 1929 and the cease of 1930 and and then fell another 36 percent between the stop of 1930 and the end of 1931.

Why had wages not fallen as they had in previous contractions? I reason was that President Herbert Hoover prevented them from falling. (Encounter
Hoover’s Economic Policies.) He had been appalled by the wage charge per unit cuts in the 1920-1921 low and had preached a “high wage” policy throughout the 1920s. By the belatedly 1920s, many concern and labor leaders and bookish economists believed that policies to go along wage rates high would maintain workers’ level of purchasing, providing the “steadier” markets necessary to thwart economic contractions. When President Hoover organized conferences in December 1929 to urge business, industrial, and labor leaders to hold the line on wage rates and dividends, he found a willing audience. The highly protective Smoot-Hawley Tariff, passed in mid-1930, was supposed to provide protection from lower-cost imports for firms that maintained wage rates. Thus, it was not until well into 1931 that the steadily deteriorating business organisation conditions led the boards of directors of a number of larger firms to begin significant wage rate cuts, ofttimes over the protest of the firms’ top executives, who had pledged to maintain wage rates.

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff was another piece of Hoover’s strategy. Though in that location was not a full general call for tariff increases, Hoover proposed it in 1929 as a means of aiding farmers. He speedily lost control of the bill and information technology ended up


protecting American businesses in full general with much less real protection for farmers. Many of the tariff increases in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff were quite large; for example, the tariff on Canadian hard winter wheat rose 40 percent, and that on scientific drinking glass instruments rose from 65 percent to 85 percent. Overall on dutiable imports the tariff rate rose from twoscore.one percent to 53.21 per centum. At that place was some explicit retaliation for the American tariff increases such as Espana’southward Wais Tariff. Some other countries’ planned tariff increases were encouraged and probably expedited by the activity of the United States.

Firms also heeded Hoover’s call to let the contraction fall on
profits
rather than on dividends. Dividends in 1930 were almost as large as in 1929, but undistributed corporate profits plummeted from $2.8 billion in 1929 to −$ii.six billion in 1930. (These numbers may audio small, just compared with the 1929 U.S. GNP of $103.1 billion, they were substantial.) The value of firms’ securities barbarous sharply, leading to a significant deterioration in the portfolios of banks. As atmospheric condition worsened and banks’ losses increased,
banking concern runs
and banking concern failures increased. The first major bank runs and failures occurred in the Southeast in November 1930; these were followed by more runs and failures in Dec. At that place was some other flurry of bank runs and banking concern failures in the late spring and early summer of 1931. Subsequently United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland left the gold standard in September 1931, the Federal Reserve System initiated relatively big increases in the discount rate to stem the gold outflow. Overseas investors in nations withal on the aureate standard expected the Us to either devalue the dollar or get off the gold standard as Slap-up Britain had done. The consequence would be that the dollars they held, or their dollar-denominated securities, would be worth less. To foreclose this they sold dollars to obtain golden from the United States. The Fed’southward policy moves gave overseas investors confidence that the United States would honor its gold commitment. The ascension in American interest rates also made information technology more costly to sell American assets for dollars to redeem in gold. The resulting rise in interest rates caused not just more business failures, only also a sharp ascension in depository financial institution failures. In the late spring and early summer of 1932, the Federal Reserve System finally undertook open up market purchases, bringing some signs of relief and possible recovery to the beleaguered American economic system.

Hoover’s
fiscal policy
accelerated the refuse. In December 1929, as a means of demonstrating the administration’s organized religion in the economy, Hoover had reduced all 1929 income revenue enhancement rates by 1 percent because of the continuing budget surpluses. By 1930 the surplus had turned into a arrears that grew chop-chop as the economic system contracted. By the cease of 1931 Hoover had decided to recommend a large tax increase in an endeavor to balance the budget; Congress approved the tax increase in 1932. Personal exemptions were reduced sharply to increase the number of taxpayers, and rates were sharply increased. The lowest marginal charge per unit rose from 1.125 percent to iv.0 percent, and the top marginal charge per unit rose from 25 pct on taxable income in backlog of $100,000 to 63 percent on taxable income in backlog of $ane million as the rates were fabricated much more than progressive. Nosotros at present sympathize that such a huge taxation increment does not promote recovery during a wrinkle. By reducing households’ disposable income, it led to a reduction in household spending and a further contraction in economic activeness.

The Fed’southward expansionary
budgetary policy
concluded in the early on summer of 1932. After his election in November 1932, President-elect Roosevelt refused to outline his policies or endorse Hoover’s, and he refused to deny that he would devalue the dollar confronting gilded later on he took office in March 1933. Bank runs and banking concern failures resumed with a vengeance, and American dollars began to be redeemed for gold equally the gold outflow resumed. Equally financial conditions worsened in January and February 1933, country governments began declaring banking holidays, closing down states’ entire financial sectors. Roosevelt’s national banking vacation stopped the runs and banking failures and finally ended the contraction.

Betwixt 1929 and 1933, x,763 of the 24,970 commercial banks in the Us failed. As the public increasingly held more currency and fewer deposits, and as banks built up their excess reserves, the money supply fell 30.9 pct from its 1929 level. Though the Federal Reserve System did increase bank reserves, the increases were far besides small to cease the autumn in the money supply. Equally businesses saw their lines of credit and money reserves fall with bank closings, and consumers saw their bank deposit wealth tied up in drawn-out
bankruptcy
proceedings, spending fell, worsening the collapse in the Bully Low.

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The national banking holiday ended the protracted banking crunch, began to restore the public’s confidence in banks and the economy, and initiated a recovery from April through September 1933. President Roosevelt came into office proposing a New Deal for Americans, but his advisers believed, mistakenly, that excessive
competition
had led to overproduction, causing the depression. The centerpieces of the New Deal were the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the National Recovery Administration (NRA), both of which were aimed at reducing production and raising wages and prices. Reduced production, of class, is what happens in depressions, and it never fabricated sense to try to get the country out of depression by reduc


ing production further. In its zeal, the administration manifestly did not consider the uncomplicated impossibility of raising
all
existent wage rates and
all
real prices.

The AAA immediately set out to slaughter half-dozen million baby pigs and reduce breeding sows to reduce pork product and raise prices. Since cotton plantings were thought to be excessive, cotton farmers were paid to turn under one-quarter of the forty million acres of cotton to reduce marketed product to boost prices. Almost of the payments went to the landowners, not the tenants, making weather condition desperate for tenant farmers. Though landowners were supposed to share the payments with their tenant farmers, they were not legally obligated to practise so and about did not. As a result, tenant farmers, and particularly black tenants, who were more easily discriminated confronting, received none of the payments and less or no income from cotton wool production subsequently large portions of the crop were plowed under. Where persuasion was ineffective in inducing the many contained farmers to reduce production, the federal government intended to mandate production cutbacks and purchase the product to take it off the market and enhance prices.

The NRA was a vast experiment in cartelizing American industry. Code authorities in each manufacture were set up to determine production and investment, too as to standardize firm practices and costs. The entire appliance was aimed at raising prices and reducing, not increasing, production and investment. As the NRA codes began to accept effect in the fall of 1933, they had precisely that upshot. The recovery that had seemed so promising in the summer largely stopped, and at that place was little increase in economical activity from the fall of 1933 through midsummer 1935. Enforcement of the codes was sporadic, disagreement over the codes increased, and, in smaller, more competitive industries, fewer firms adhered to the codes. The Supreme Court ruled the NRA unconstitutional on May 27, 1935, and the AAA unconstitutional on January 6, 1936. Released from the shackles of the NRA, American industry began to aggrandize production. By the fall of 1935 a vigorous recovery was under fashion.

The introduction of the NRA had initially brought about a abrupt increase in money and real wage rates as firms attempted to comply with the NRA’s blanket code. As firms’ enthusiasm for the NRA waned, money wage rates increased picayune and real average wage rates actually fell slightly in 1934 and early 1935. In addition, many workers decided not to join contained
labor unions. These factors helped the recovery. Unhappy with the lack of matrimony ability, however, Senator Robert Wagner, in the summer of 1935, authored the National Labor Relations Deed to ensure that marriage members could force other workers to bring together their unions with a elementary bulk vote, thus effectively monopolizing the labor force. Internal dissension and the new Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) development of strategies to use the new law kept labor unions from taking advantage of the new deed until tardily in 1936. In the kickoff half of 1937, the CIO’s massive organizing drives led to labor union recognition at many large firms. Mostly, the new contracts raised hourly wage rates and created overtime wage rates equally real hourly labor costs surged.

Several other factors also pushed up real labor costs. Ane factor was the new Social Security taxes instituted in 1936 and 1937. Also, Roosevelt had pushed through a new revenue enhancement on undistributed corporate profits, expecting this to crusade firms to pay out undistributed profits in dividends. Though some firms did pay out part of the retained earnings in larger dividends, others, such equally the firms in the steel industry, also paid bonuses and raised wage rates to avoid paying their retained earnings in new taxes. As these three policies came together, real hourly labor costs jumped without corresponding increases in demand or prices, and firms responded past reducing product and laying off employees.

The second major policy change was in monetary policy. Post-obit the end of the wrinkle, banks, as a precaution against bank runs, had begun to hold large excess reserves. Officials at the Federal Reserve System knew that if banks used a large percentage of those backlog reserves to increment lending, the coin supply would quickly expand and price aggrandizement would follow. Their studies suggested that the backlog reserves were distributed widely across banks, and they assumed that these reserves were due to the low level of loan demand. Because banks were non borrowing at the discount window and the Fed had no
bonds
to sell on the open up market, its merely tool to reduce excess reserves was the new one of varying reserve requirements. Betwixt August 1, 1936, and May 1, 1937, in three steps, the Fed doubled reserve requirements for all classes of fellow member banks, wiping out much of the backlog reserves, particularly at the larger banks. The banks, burned past their lack of excess reserves in the early 1930s, responded by beginning to restore the excess reserves, which entailed reducing loans. Within eighteen months, excess reserves were almost as large as earlier the reserve requirement increases, and, necessarily, the stock of coin was lower.

By June 1937, the recovery—during which the unemployment rate had fallen to 12 percent—was over. Two policies, labor cost increases and a contractionary monetary policy, acquired the economy to contract farther. Although the contraction ended around June 1938, the ensuing recovery was quite slow. The average rate of unemployment for all of 1938 was 19.ane percent, compared with an average


unemployment rate for all of 1937 of 14.3 percent. Even in 1940, the unemployment rate still averaged 14.6 percent.

Why was the recovery from the Neat Depression and so tiresome? A number of economists now debate that the NRA and monetary policy were of import factors. Some maintain that Roosevelt’southward vacillating policies and new federal regulations hindered recovery (Gary Dean Best, Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway, and Gary Walton), while others emphasize monetary factors (Milton Friedman
and Anna Schwartz, Christian Saint-Etienne, and Barry Eichengreen). The New Deal’s NRA has received much criticism (Gary Dean Best, Gene Smiley, Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway, Gary Walton, and Michael Weinstein). A at present discredited caption from Alvin Hansen argued that the United States had exhausted its investment opportunities. E. Cary Brownish, Larry Peppers, and Thomas Renaghan emphasize federal fiscal policies that were a drag on the return to full employment. Michael Bernstein argues that investment problems retarded the recovery considering the older established industries could non generate sufficient investment while newer, growing industries had problem obtaining investment funds in the depressed environment. Alexander Field argues that the uncontrolled
housing
investment of the 1920s severely reduced housing investment in the 1930s.

I of the most coherent explanations, which pulls together several of these themes, is what economic historian Robert Higgs calls “regime doubt.” According to Higgs, Roosevelt’s New Deal led business organisation leaders to question whether the current “government” of private
property rights
in their firms’ upper-case letter and its income stream would be protected. They became less willing, therefore, to invest in assets with long lives. Roosevelt had starting time suspended the
antitrust
laws and so that American businesses would cooperate in government-instigated
cartels; he and so switched to using the antitrust laws to prosecute firms for cooperating. New taxes had been imposed, and some were then removed; increasing
regulation
of businesses had reduced businesses’ ability to deed independently and heighten capital; and new legislation had reduced their liberty in hiring and employing labor. Public opinion surveys of concern at the end of the 1930s provided evidence of this regime uncertainty. Public opinion polls in March and May 1939 asked whether the attitude of the Roosevelt administration toward business was delaying recovery, and 54 and 53 percent, respectively, said
yes
while 26 and 31 per centum said
no.
Fifty-half-dozen percent believed that in ten years there would be more government control of business while but 22 percentage thought there would be less. Threescore-v percent of executives surveyed thought that the Roosevelt assistants policies had so affected business organization confidence that the recovery had been seriously held back. Initially many firms were reluctant to engage in war contracts. The vast majority believed that Roosevelt’due south administration was strongly antibusiness, and this discouraged practical cooperation with Washington on rearmament.

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It is unremarkably argued that World State of war 2 provided the stimulus that brought the American economy out of the Smashing Depression. The number of unemployed workers declined past 7,050,000 between 1940 and 1943, but the number in military machine service rose by 8,590,000. The reduction in unemployment tin can be explained by the typhoon, not by the economic recovery. The rise in real GNP presents similar problems. Virtually estimates prove declines in real consumption spending, which means that consumers were worse off during the war. Business investment fell during the war. Government spending on the war effort exceeded the expansion in existent GNP. These figures are suspect, however, considering we know that government estimates of the value of munitions spending, to name one major expanse, were increasingly exaggerated as the war progressed. In fact, the extensive
price controls, rationing, and government command of product render information on GNP, consumption, investment, and the cost level less meaningful. How can we establish a consistent price alphabetize when government mandates eliminated the product of most consumer durable goods? What does the price of, say, gasoline mean when information technology is arbitrarily held at a low level and gasoline purchases are rationed to address the shortage created by the price controls? What does the toll of new tires mean when no new tires are produced for consumers? For consumers, the recovery came with the war’south end, when they could again purchase products that were unavailable during the war and unaffordable during the 1930s.

Could the Great Depression happen again? It could, but such an event is unlikely because the Federal Reserve Board is unlikely to sit idly by while the money supply falls by one-third. The wisdom gained in the years since the 1930s probably gives our policymakers enough insight to make decisions that will keep the economy out of such a major low.



Further Reading

Bernstein, Michael.
The Great Depression: Delayed Recovery and Economic Change in America, 1929-1939.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Best, Gary Dean.
Pride, Prejudice, and Politics: Roosevelt Versus Recovery, 1933-1938.
New York: Praeger, 1991.

Bordo, Michael D., Claudia Goldin, and Eugene N. White, eds.
The Defining Moment: The Slap-up Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Brown, East. Cary. “Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A Reappraisal.”
American Economical Review
46 (December 1956): 857-879.

Brunner, Karl, ed.
The Great Depression Revisited.
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.

Cole, Harold L., and Lee E. Ohanian. “New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A Full general Equilibrium Analysis.”
Journal of Political Economy
112 (August 2004): 779-816.

Eichengreen, Barry.
Aureate Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Bully Depression, 1919-1939.
New York: Oxford University Printing, 1992.

Field, Alexander J. “Uncontrolled Land Development and the Duration of the Depression in the The states.”
Journal of Economical History
52 (June 1992): 785-805.

Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz.
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.
Princeton: Princeton Academy Printing, 1963.

Glasner, David.
Free Banking and Monetary Reform.
New York: Cambridge University Printing, 1989.

Hall, Thomas, and J. David Ferguson.
The Corking Low: An International Disaster of Perverse Economic Policies.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Printing, 1998.

Hansen, Alvin.
Full Recovery or Stagnation?
New York: Norton, 1938.

Higgs, Robert.
Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Authorities.
New York: Oxford Academy Printing, 1987.

Higgs, Robert. “Authorities Incertitude: Why the Great Depression Lasted Then Long and Why Prosperity Returned After the War.”
Independent Review
one (Spring 1997): 561-590.

Higgs, Robert. “Wartime Prosperity? A Reassessment of the U.S. Economy in the 1940s.”
Journal of Economic History
52 (March 1992): 41-60.

O’Brien, Anthony Patrick. “A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage Rigidity During the Neat Depression.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics
104 (November 1989): 719-735.

Peppers, Larry. “Total-Employment Surplus Assay and Structural Alter: The 1930s.”
Explorations in Economic History
10 (Wintertime 1973): 197-210.

Renaghan, Thomas. “A New Look at Fiscal Policy in the 1930s.”
Inquiry in Economical History
11 (1988): 171-183.

Saint-Etienne, Christian.
The Keen Depression, 1929-1938: Lessons for the 1980s.
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984.

Smiley, Gene.
Rethinking the Great Depression: A New View of Its Causes and Consequences.
Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002.

Temin, Peter.
Did Monetary Forces Cause the Peachy Depression?
New York: Norton, 1976.

Temin, Peter.
Lessons from the Great Depression.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.

Temin, Peter. “Socialism and Wages in the Recovery from the Great Low in the U.s.a. and Germany.”
Journal of Economic History
50 (June 1990): 297-308.

Temin, Peter, and Barrie Wigmore. “The End of One Big Deflation.”
Explorations in Economic History
27 (Oct 1990): 483-502.

Vedder, Richard G., and Lowell P. Gallaway.
Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America.
New York: Holmes and Meier, 1993.

Walton, Gary Chiliad., ed.
Regulatory Change in an Atmosphere of Crunch: Current Implications of the Roosevelt Years.
New York: Academic Press, 1979.

Weinstein, Michael.
Recovery and Redistribution Under the NIRA.
Amsterdam: Northward-Holland, 1980.

Wright, Gavin. “The Political Economy of New Bargain Spending: An Econometric Analysis.”
Review of Economics and Statistics
56 (February 1974): 30-38.


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