The Nullification Crisis of 1832 Centered Around
The Nullification Crunch
by Lucas Kelley
Nullification Crunch | Exposition and Protest | South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification 1832 | Andrew Jackson’due south Nullification Proclamation 1832 |Tariff of Abominations | John C. Calhoun | Webster Hayne Debate | Doctrine of Nullification | Nullification Convention 1832 | Tariff of 1828 | Tariff of 1832 | Jackson’s Force Bill
Although it had been simmering for several years, the nullification crisis came to a head in November of 1832 when an associates of Southward Carolinians declared the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 to be unconstitutional. In the same convention, they forbade the drove of import taxes on strange goods within the state afterwards February i, 1833, and warned that whatever military action to forcefulness the collection of duties would cause South Carolina to secede from the Matrimony and form a carve up government. President Andrew Jackson and others effectually the country viewed such action every bit treason, and regardless of the threat of disunion, Jackson publicly issued a statement announcing that he would, if necessary, invade the Palmetto State to collect the federal tax. As the deadline of February one approached, however, both sides realized the possible irreparable harm that could come up should violence erupt between South Carolina and the U.s.a. authorities, and they sought a compromise. Kentucky senator Henry Clay, a effigy somewhat outside of the disharmonize, constructed a compromise whereby the tariffs would exist gradually reduced over a period of years, and both Jackson and the nullifiers agreed to it. Thus, the Union remained intact.
The American Civil War is the most studied and nigh familiar conflict between advocates of states’ rights and the dominance of the federal government, but it was not the only such conflict in the nineteenth century. In fact, the early United States witnessed several disunion movements from a variety of regions, both Due north and South. The nullification crisis foreshadowed the secession crisis of the early 1860s, and despite beingness xxx years autonomously, the two events share several themes. In both cases, radical fire-eaters in South Carolina threatened secession and declared their state’s sovereignty, national politicians debated the nature of the Constitution, and the economic differences of the North and Due south took center stage.
However, we should not make the mistake of just viewing the nullification crisis through the lens of the Civil War, as is often the case. South Carolinians at the time had no clue that civil war was on the horizon. Instead, the decision to nullify the federal tariff was based on their interpretations of the Constitution, the Revolutionary War, and the republican principles of the previous generation of statesmen. Their “vantage betoken,” according to historian Lacy Ford, was “ane looking backward…rather than frontwards to secession and Ceremonious State of war.” It was a divide conflict over different issues and resulted in a unlike, less mortiferous outcome. Violence did not break out in the 1830s, nor did a group of Southern states unite in opposition to the North. Unlike 30 years later, southerners were undecided on their position in the Union. A few were willing to risk secession but the vast majority accepted the authority and sovereignty of the federal government. Still, the nullification crisis is all the same a clear manifestation of the sectionalism that grew increasingly more volatile in the United States as the nineteenth century progressed.
Historians debate the underlying cause of the nullification crunch, merely they agree that the most overt reason for South Carolinians’ discontent involved the protective tariffs of the 1820s. In the wake of the War of 1812, Congress hoped to promote American manufacturing and reduce the United States’ dependence on foreign appurtenances, specially those produced in England. Because of their longer period of industrialization, the British could manufacture goods at a lower cost than American domestic businesses, so without tariffs, Americans were more probable to buy the cheaper foreign goods. Past taxing imports, Congress hoped that Americans would buy American-fabricated goods because they would exist artificially cheaper than those produced abroad.
In theory, the tariffs were supposed to benefit the entire nation, but S Carolinians and many other southerners hated the tariffs, seeing the “protection” of domestic appurtenances equally a sectional policy unjustly benefitting the industrial North over the agrarian South. Northern manufacturers’ master market was within the United states of america, as they sought to attract Americans to buy their goods. Southern planters’ chief market for their cotton and other agronomical products, however, were the textile mills of the British Isles, and they reasoned that if British exporters had more than difficulty selling products in the United States, so southern exports would be similarly taxed in United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland. In other words, the S stood to do good through international free merchandise, and the Due north gained with taxation.
Coupled with what they saw as a federally-sanctioned sectional policy, S Carolinians, more than other southern states, experienced a dramatic economic downturn throughout the 1820s. As the State of war of 1812 drew to a close, the national economy experienced abundant prosperity, and South Carolinians’ staple crops, such every bit cotton fiber, sold for twice their normal prices. In this context, many planters bought new land and slaves on credit to accept advantage of the boom times. The financial chimera burst, nonetheless, with the Panic of 1819. Currency grew scarce, and S Carolinians could non pay dorsum their creditors. At the same time, overproduction of agricultural goods flooded the international market place, and prices of appurtenances plummeted and would non rise again until 1829. Naturally, this context made South Carolinians fifty-fifty more opposed to any policies, such as protective tariffs, that could further harm their downtrodden economy.
Every bit their fiscal future grew bleaker, Southward Carolinians at every political level began to see nullification equally a viable option later Congress passed the tariff of 1828, a police force they accounted the “Tariff of Abominations.” Unable to prevent the nib’due south passage in either the Senate or House of Representatives, Due south Carolina’southward delegation met once in Washington and again afterwards returning to the Palmetto State to devise some program to prevent further protection. Concurrently, local radicals held mass meetings beyond South Carolina, decrying the tariff every bit unconstitutional and detrimental to the state and the South every bit a whole. The country legislature had already taken a stand in 1824, blessing resolutions that declared protection to be unconstitutional, but the passage of the Tariff of Abominations caused some politicians to clamor for a nullification convention to take identify in 1829. Most significantly, a legislative committee privately contacted John C. Calhoun and asked for his opinion on the matter.
During 1828, Calhoun plant himself in an bad-mannered position. On the one hand, he was the current vice-president under John Quincy Adams and was likewise on the ballot equally Andrew Jackson’s vice-president in the upcoming election. Every bit a candidate for national part, Calhoun wanted to entreatment to the widest number of voters possible and take a neutral stance on the tariff question. On the other manus, S Carolinians already supporting nullification and a radical states rights view of the Union pressured Calhoun to side with them in the ongoing conflict. He responded by anonymously composing resolutions for the Due south Carolina land legislature.
The Southward Carolina Exposition and Protest, Calhoun used this document to outline his interpretation of the Constitution and provide a logical design for nullification. The tariff effect was significant, and Calhoun repeatedly mentioned the exclusive nature of protection. The crux of his argument, however, stemmed from his strict interpretation of the Constitution, and his ideas would become even more important as the crisis worsened. According to Calhoun, the federal authorities was “i of specifick [sic] powers, and it tin rightfully exercise only the powers expressly granted [in the Constitution], and those that may exist necessary and proper to conduct them into effect, all others beingness reserved expressly to the states.” He admitted that the Constitution did provide the federal regime the power to revenue enhancement imports, but simply as a way to generate acquirement, “a power in its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective…duties.” The power to tax imports was beingness “driveling” past promoting the interests of the Northward over those of the South. Calhoun and so went on to elaborate in slap-up particular equally to how exactly the tariff injured the southern states.
After outlining all his grievances against protection, he returned to the upshot of constitutional interpretation and somewhen broached the subject of nullification. Calhoun understood that the federal government and the various state governments shared ability, just for him, the nullification crunch could only be resolved “in determining correctly to which [government] the various political powers ought to vest.” Although the federal government and land governments did share some authorization, the true power, in Calhoun’south view, resided in united states of america, as it was the states that originally ratified the Constitution. Therefore, states had the authority to translate the Constitution as they saw fit, and if a sure country or states deemed an act unconstitutional, so they had the authority, sovereignty, and legal correct to nullify it in a convention. Thus, “effectual protection is afforded to the minority against the oppression of the accented majority.” The South Carolina legislature canonical Calhoun’due south
Exposition and Protest, and the document provided nullifiers a basis from which to make a logical legal argument on the constitutionality of the tariff.
Exposition and Protest
outlined how to go about the procedure of nullification, Calhoun emphasized in it the demand for patience. For fifty-fifty as the South Carolina state legislature debated whether to prefer Calhoun’due south resolutions every bit their own, American voters were pondering whether to keep John Quincy Adams in office or elect the war hero Andrew Jackson to accept over the presidency of the Us. Equally Jackson hailed from the Due south, nullifiers hoped that “this eminent citizen,” in words of Calhoun’s document, would take their side in the controversy “with a complete restoration of the pure principles of our government.” Jackson did win the election with Calhoun as vice-president. South Carolinians, however, could not have been more mistaken every bit to Jackson’south view on nullification. Every bit president, he would become straight involved in the conflict and would utilize his influence to counter nullifiers at every footstep.[v]
The 1828-1829 Southward Carolina legislature could come to no immediate conclusion regarding nullification, and the crunch appeared to accept a back seat until Congress chose to once again act on the tariff question. The Eaton Affair temporarily distracted the nation from the nullification crisis, and Jackson and Calhoun grew estranged due to questions over Jackson’s office in the 1818 invasion of Florida. Two specific events, though seemingly unrelated to the nullification crisis, further radicalized South Carolina and heightened tensions within the nation every bit a whole.
The commencement of these was the Webster-Hayne debate that occupied the U.Due south. Senate for much of the 1829-1830 legislative session. A serial of speeches that took identify over eight days in January, the debate pitted Robert Hayne of South Carolina against Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and focused on the question of whether or not the federal regime should limit the sale of public land. Westerners wanted to proceed land sales to maintain the population explosion that was going on in their states. New Englanders, withal, hoped to curtail the surveying of land as a way to preclude the ongoing drain of industrial workers moving west, and Webster was their main advocate on the senate floor. Although the argue did non directly involve southern interests, Hayne allied himself with the West with a vague hope of moving the federal government’south revenue enhancement policy away from protective tariffs. However, the land sales question faded later Hayne entered the fray, and constitutional interpretation soon took middle stage.
Calhoun’southward anonymous statement confronting the tariff of 1828 had already somewhat introduced the conflict over the doctrine of nullification into the national political arena. However, the Webster-Hayne fence demonstrated to the entire nation through two of the twenty-four hours’s greatest orators the significance of the growing disharmonize. One senator event went so far as to say that the debate “seems to have metamorphosed the Senate, non only…on the state of the Union, but on the land of the Union in all times past, present, and to come up.” Hayne continued to maintain united states of america’ rights interpretation of the Constitution that had been promulgated by Calhoun and other nullifiers and argued that a land had the right “to estimate of the violations of the Constitution on the role of the Federal Regime, and to protect” its citizens “from unconstitutional laws.” In opposition, Webster argued that only the Supreme Court had the power to declare laws unconstitutional, and in that location was no case, other than revolution, where a state could “interfere and stop the progress of the General Regime.” Historians and the national political pundits at the time concur that Webster won the fence because he publicly exposed the doctrine of nullification as treasonous and prevented an alliance from forming between the South and Due west confronting the industrial North. The debate also served to increase sectional tensions and further isolate South Carolina’southward radical proponents of nullification from other southerners and westerners that seemingly had a mutual interest in reducing the tariff.[seven]
The Nat Turner slave insurrection was the 2nd event that contributed to the growing national tension over the nullification crisis. In Baronial of 1831, Nat Turner and a posse of other slaves rampaged through Virginia’s Southampton County, killing around sixty whites. Though it was relatively pocket-size, the rebellion took on enormous importance in the minds of southern white planters because information technology represented a radical claiming to the institution of slavery and to their personal rubber. South Carolinians especially were frightened. Virtually counties along the Carolina declension contained many more than people of colour than whites, and if these slaves chose to throw off their masters, then the small white population was in danger. South Carolina Governor James Hamilton, Jr., was so nervous that he personally asked Governor John Floyd of Virginia for more data, presumably as a fashion to prevent a similar insurrection from occurring in the Palmetto State.
The question of nullifying the protective tariffs and this slave uprising may seem unrelated, merely the 2 were closely related in the minds of many antebellum white southerners. Both were examples of northern injuries to the South, and only through nullification could the South deal with them. For several years, northern abolitionists and gratis people of color had circulated pamphlets and newspapers throughout the Due south, trying to testify that slavery was immoral and should be concluded. Some pamphlets, like David Walker’s
Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, even advocated violence, so when Turner massacred Southampton whites, it was only natural that some southerners agreed that the coup “had its origin among, and emanated from, the Yankee population.” Since these northerners were willing to go then far as promote insurrection, some nullifiers asked themselves what would proceed them from passing a federal police that legally prohibited slavery, as they had already passed the tariffs of 1824 and 1828 in spite of southern protest. Thus, if South Carolina could nullify the tariffs, then slavery would be forever protected since the southern states could ever declare a law prohibiting slavery unconstitutional and nullify it, as well.
Equally a whole, 1830 and most of 1831 were discouraging times on both the national and local scene for South Carolinian nullifiers. Webster discredited united states of america’ rights interpretation in early on 1830, and back up for the doctrine of nullification was fifty-fifty flagging amidst local Due south Carolinians in the early months of 1831. Many nullifiers too wanted to know Calhoun’s position on the issue. As vice-president and a Carolinian, many hoped that his public back up would bolster the nullification crusade. Calhoun, however, wanted his support to remain hush-hush. Though his
Exposition and Protest
had become the official doctrine of the South Carolina legislature, no one knew of his support for nullification. For many years Calhoun had sought the presidency, and he understood that back up for nullification would amerce potential voters in the North. But afterwards the interruption with Jackson, Calhoun may have finally realized that he could never become president and he might besides back up the doctrine he believed in, or he merely might have thought outright back up for nullification would gain southern votes. Whatever the case, Calhoun publicly revealed his stance in July of 1831, and almost overnight, the nullifiers accepted him as the leader of their crusade.
Congress’s actions in the 1831-1832 session as well fueled the fires of nullification. Though nullification had few supporters outside of South Carolina, some Americans, and most southerners in particular, agreed that the current tariff needed modifying. Opponents of protection even held a national “anti-tariff” convention in Philadelphia in Oct of 1831 where they criticized the tariff but did non declare it to exist unconstitutional. These tariff detractors institute an unexpected friend in John Quincy Adams. After losing the presidency to Jackson in 1828, Adams returned to Washington in 1831 equally a representative from Massachusetts, and although he had championed protection while in the White House, Adams worked tirelessly to pass a bill in the House of Representatives that would placate southerners and those opposed to the tariff, while also maintaining protection on some goods. His efforts resulted in the Tariff of 1832, which Congress passed in June. It was a compromise between sectional interests and momentarily removed the tariff question from the national political scene. Adams’ tariff did not gratify nullifiers, and events in S Carolina would quickly bring the issue back to Washington.
With Calhoun at their head, South Carolina nullifiers campaigned throughout the Palmetto State for pop back up. They wanted to hold such a majority in the country legislature that it would allow them to act uninhibited on issues related to nullification. In previous years, unionist and moderate state representatives kept their more radical peers in cheque, but the 1832-1833 session would be dissimilar. In spite of unionists in Charleston and the upcountry’due south mountainous regions, nullifiers drummed up enough state-wide support in the October elections through stump speeches, economic appeals, and fifty-fifty violence to gain the necessary ii-thirds majority. Almost as before long as the results were announced, the new legislature held a special session, and at the behest of Governor Hammond, they passed a police force calling for a state convention to be held in Nov in which they hoped nullification would finally become a reality.
South Carolinians assembled at the Nullification Convention, as this South Carolina convention would come to be known, nullified the tariffs of 1828 and 1832. They declared that tariffs were “unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate[d] the true meaning and intent thereof, and are goose egg, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State…” There was some disagreement over when nullification would have effect. Radicals hoped for firsthand nullification, while moderates argued that Congress deserved one more run a risk to eliminate the tariff. The groups compromised and prepare February 1, 1833, every bit the engagement S Carolina would no longer enforce the revenue enhancement on imported goods. The two sides likewise agreed that if the federal regime attempted to collect the import tax by force that it would be “inconsistent with the longer constancy of South Carolina in the Matrimony” and would issue in the state forming a “divide Government” from that of the United States. Thus non only did the convention delegates act on their theory of nullification, they also threatened secession.
Nullification endangered the sovereignty of the federal government, and equally president of the United States, Andrew Jackson had a determination to make. Should he permit these radical nullifiers in Due south Carolina to threaten the integrity of the Union by taking no activeness or should he march into S Carolina at the head of an regular army and hang Calhoun and his compatriots? Jackson had been somewhat equivocal on the tariff question while in part, and no ane knew the form he would choose to have.
Throughout his presidency, the tariff question had perplexed Jackson. He was a southern planter, and it was in his personal financial interest to lower the tariff. Because of their shared livelihood, radical nullifiers hoped the Tennessean would use his influence to lower the tariff in one case he took office. But Jackson also fought the British in the State of war of 1812, where he recognized the need for a national economic system contained of the manipulation of European powers, and he privately admitted that the effects of the 1828 tariff were “doubtless overrated, both in its evils and its advantages.” When he did speak publicly on the issue, Jackson usually advocated for compromise, and he initially tried to convince nullifiers and proponents of protection to run into to the proficient of the Spousal relationship every bit a whole, not just to their section, when enacting policies related to the tariff. Understanding the elimination of the public debt as the primary function of the tariff, Jackson too vowed that he would accept no action on the tariff until all debt was eliminated, which would occur in 1833 at the earliest.
As undecided as he was on the usefulness of the tariff, Jackson publicly maintained that the tariff was constitutional, and he abhorred nullification. He argued that u.s., when adopting the Constitution, “delegated their whole authority over imports to the General Government without limitation or restriction.” This reflected his overall view that the majority rule was best for the country. Similarly, Jackson’s vehemence toward nullification was likewise due partly to his devotion to the principle of majority dominion. Nullifiers in one small state did not have the authorization or ability to counteract laws passed by the representatives of the American people in Washington. Jackson also took event with nullifiers because of their insistence on secession equally a viable grade of action if tariff laws were non reformed. The Union existed in perpetuity, and whatever try to break information technology upwards would upshot in violence. For Jackson, nullification equaled “Treason confronting our Government.”[eleven]
After South Carolinians nullified the tariff in their Nov 1832 convention, the nation waited with baited jiff for Old Hickory’s response. Initially, the president seemed to take the nullifiers’ side in his almanac message to Congress on December 4, highlighting his agrarian values and recommending a gradual reduction of the tariff. Six days later, however, Jackson issued his Nullification Proclamation, in which he chosen the nullifiers’ notion that the Constitution’s authority was derived from the states an “impractical absurdity.” He and then went on to warn Southward Carolinians that he would non sit idly by as they committed what he considered treason but would employ his potency as president to ensure that duties were nerveless on imports, even if it meant using armed forces forcefulness. Old Hickory continued to demonstrate hostility towards nullification in his Force Bill Bulletin, sent to Congress on Jan 16, 1833. While he had merely warned of military machine intervention before, Jackson used this message to explicitly request that Congress revise militia laws so that he could legally assemble a force and march on South Carolina with the full bankroll of the federal government.
The militancy of Jackson’s deportment alienated many of his southern supporters who, though critical of nullification, were nevertheless opposed to military intervention, and nullifiers initially gained some popular back up. But as the February 1 deadline approached, nullifiers grew wary. They know that Sometime Hickory, the hero of the War of 1812, was a man of action, so few doubted that he did mean to invade S Carolina. But they also realized that they presently had the upper mitt in the conflict subsequently recently gaining external sympathy from those citizens who shared a house states’ rights perspective. Therefore, at a group coming together in Charleston on January 21, nullifiers voted to suspend the nullification of the tariff until Congress adjourned later in the leap. In what historian William W. Freehling called a “strategic retreat,” their conclusion essentially forced Congress to either reduce the tariff, ending the crisis, or pass the Forcefulness Bill in spite of southern opposition, a determination that in nullifiers’ minds would finally crusade the unabridged South to side with them. Although radical S Carolinians had sparked it and President Jackson had farther inflamed it, the resolution to the nullification crisis vicious on the shoulders of members of Congress.
With his influence slipping due to his militancy on the question, Jackson’s Force Bill Message had piddling chance in Congress. His supporters in the Senate Judiciary Commission did bring a draft to the Senate floor, and the Senate immediately voted to contend the neb. But as senators on both sides of the beak grew to empathise the implication of its passage, substantially authorizing the employ of military force, support for the neb waned. Calhoun played a role in the argue, besides. He had resigned from the vice presidency in Dec and Due south Carolinians sent him back to Washington as their land’s senator, a mail service that would allow him to be the main advocate of nullification in the national spotlight. Thus in the Strength Bill debate, Calhoun was able to evoke some sympathy for the South Carolina crusade. In the House of Representatives, Jackson’s proposal fared fifty-fifty worse, as the pecker did not go far out of committee. The Forcefulness Neb appeared dead.
Although Jackson’southward bill stalled in both houses, Congress had yet to side with South Carolinians in the confrontation. In the midst of the Force Bill contend, New York Jacksonian Gulian C. Verplanck introduced a neb in the House that would slash tariff rates in half over a menses of several years. Jackson and his assistants publicly supported Verplanck’s measure in order to win back support from southerners and evidence them he was willing to compromise. Although it did quiet southern critics, the Verplanck bill had little take a chance. Pro-tariff representatives could not stand for such a desperate reduction, and South Carolinians and their sympathizers in Congress refused to back a bill that would give some credit to the president. The situation was only as well volatile for either nullifiers or the administration to successfully enact a compromise.
Outside of the conflict, Henry Dirt was the perfect person to devise a compromise. Dirt had long been a supporter of high protective tariffs, only the Kentuckian was also a political enemy of Jackson through his leadership of the National-Republican Party. Throughout the nullification crisis, Dirt had remained aristocratic, but as the state of affairs worsened, he saw the need to create a policy that would “foreclose civil state of war and relieve us from the danger of entrusting to Andrew Jackson large armies.” Their mutual hatred for Jackson drew Dirt together with Calhoun, and the Kentuckian drafted a tariff reduction bill that would be acceptable for Calhoun and the more moderate wing of the nullifier political party. Similar Verplank’s proposal, it slashed protection gradually, but did so at a much faster rate. Not to be ignored, Clay recognized the necessity of Jackson’due south support for a successful comprise, besides, so to delight the president, Clay convinced plenty congressmen to drop opposition to the Force Bill. Thus on March 1, 1832, both the Force Nib and Clay’due south tariff became police. 10 days later, South Carolina delegates to the Nullification Convention reconvened in Columbia and rescinded their Nullification Ordinance. Civil war was avoided, if only temporarily.
In the Due north, New England Federalists clamored for disunion during the War of 1812, a movement that would culminate at the Hartford Convention in December 1814.
Lacy K. Ford Jr.,
Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860
(New York: Oxford Academy Press, 1988), 125.
John C. Calhoun,
The South Carolina Exposition and Protest, in
The Papers of John C. Calhoun, ed. Clyde Wilson and Edwin Hemphill (Columbia, SC: The Academy of Southward Carolina Press, 1977), Ten, 444. Two versions of
The Exposition and Protest
exist. One was Calhoun’due south first draft given to the South Carolina legislative committee. The committee made some minor changes to the document before they presented it to the legislature as a whole, and this edited certificate is the 2d copy. Here I have chosen to quote from Calhoun’south original draft, but both can be seen in
The Papers of John C. Calhoun, X, 442-534.
Ibid., 494, 506.
Besides known equally the Petticoat Affair, the Eaton Affair was a social scandal involving Jackson, his cabinet members, and their wives during 1830-1831. When John Eaton, Jackson’s secretary of war, married newly-widowed Margaret Timberlake, the wives of other chiffonier members spurned her because of her scandalous reputation. Jackson attempted to rectify the situation. Ultimately all members of Jackson’s cabinet resigned, and Jackson had to appoint new chiffonier members for most of the posts.
Levi Woodbury, quoted in Herman Belz, “Foreword,” in Herman Belz, ed.,
The Webster-Hayne Debate on the Nature of the Union
(Indianapolis: Freedom Fund, 2000), 9; Robert Y. Hayne, quoted in ibid., eleven; Daniel Webster, quoted in ibid., xii.
John Floyd to James Hamilton, Jr., November 19, 1831, John Floyd Papers, 1823-1867, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. For a digital re-create of Walker’south
Appeal, run into: https://archive.org/stream/walkersappealinfwalk#folio/n9/style/1up.
“An Ordinance, to Nullify certain Acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be Laws laying Duties and Imposts on the Importation of Strange Bolt,” in
State Papers on Nullification: Including the Public Acts of the Convention of the People of Southward Carolina, Assembled at Columbia, November xix, 1832 and March eleven, 1833; The Declaration of the President of the United States, and the Proceedings of the Several Land Legislatures which have Acted on the Subject field
(Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1834), 29, 31. This source tin exist found online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ordnull.asp.
Andrew Jackson quoted in Richard E. Ellis,
The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Commonwealth, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis
(New York: Oxford University Printing, 1987), 43.
Andrew Jackson, quoted in ibid., 43, 48.
Andrew Jackson, quoted in ibid., 83.
William Due west. Freehling,
Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836
(New York: Harper, 1965), 289. Most resolutions of southern state legislatures related to the nullification crisis can be found in
Land Papers on Nullification.
Henry Dirt to Peter B. Porter, February 16, 1833, in
The Papers of Henry Clay, Robert Seager, Jr., and Melba Porter Hay, eds. 10 vols. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984-1991), 8:624.
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———. “The Nullification Controversy Revisited.”
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This is a PDF re-create available on line of the original Exposition and Protest, Reported by the Special Committee of the Business firm of Representatives on The Tariff Dec. 19th, 1828.
This is a copy available on line of the South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, November 24, 1832.
This is a copy available on line of Andrew Jackson’south Nullification Proclamation of December ten, 1832.
No other sources listed.
The Nullification Crisis of 1832 Centered Around