The Salt I Agreement in 1972 Brought About

Two conferences between the United States and Soviet Union involving artillery control

For the Wikipedia creation protection method, run across WP:Common salt.

The
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(Salt) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the U.s. and the Soviet Union. The Cold War superpowers dealt with arms control in two rounds of talks and agreements:
Table salt I
and
Salt II.

Negotiations commenced in Helsinki, in November 1969.^[i]
Table salt I led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an acting agreement between the 2 countries.

Although Salt Ii resulted in an agreement in 1979 in Vienna, the The states Senate chose not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took identify afterward that yr. The Supreme Soviet did not ratify it either. The understanding expired on December 31, 1985, and was non renewed, although both sides continued to respect it.

The talks led to the STARTs, or

St
rategic

A
rms

R
eduction

T
reaties, which consisted of First I, a 1991 completed agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Showtime II, a 1993 agreement betwixt the United States and Russia, which was never ratified past the U.s., both of which proposed limits on multiple-warhead capacities and other restrictions on each side’s number of nuclear weapons. A successor to Offset I, New START, was proposed and was eventually ratified in February 2011.

SALT I Treaty

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Table salt I is the common proper name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Understanding signed on May 26, 1972. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels and provided for the addition of new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers only afterward the same number of older intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and SLBM launchers had been dismantled.^[2]
Common salt I as well limited land-based ICBMs that were in range from the northeastern border of the Continental United states to the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union.^[3]
In improver, Table salt I limited the number of SLBM capable submarines that NATO and the United States could operate to fifty with a maximum of 800 SLBM launchers betwixt them. If the United States or NATO were to increase that number, the Soviets could respond with increasing their arsenal by the same amount.

The strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United states were changing in character in 1968. The total number of missiles held by the United States had been static since 1967 at ane,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs but there was an increasing number of missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads being deployed. MIRVs carried multiple nuclear warheads, oftentimes with dummies, to misfile ABM systems, making MIRV defence by ABM systems increasingly difficult and expensive.^[2]
Both sides were likewise permitted to increment their number of SLBM forces but only they disassembled an equivalent number of older ICBMs or SLBM launchers on older submarines.

One of the terms of the treaty required both countries to limit the number of deployment sites protected by an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system to ane each. The thought of that organization was to foreclose a competition in ABM deployment between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Unions had deployed such a organization effectually Moscow in 1966, and the U.s. announced an ABM program to protect twelve ICBM sites in 1967. After 1968, the Soviets tested a organisation for the SS-ix missile, otherwise known as the R-36 missile.^[4]
A modified 2-tier Moscow ABM system is nevertheless used. The Usa built but one ABM site to protect a Minuteman base in North Dakota where the “Safeguard” Programme was deployed. That base was increasingly more vulnerable to attacks by the Soviet ICBMs because of the advancement in Soviet missile technology.

Negotiations lasted from November 17, 1969, to May 26, 1972, in a serial of meetings beginning in Helsinki, with the American delegation headed past Gerard C. Smith, manager of the Arms Command and Disarmament Agency. Subsequent sessions alternated between Vienna and Helsinki. After a long deadlock, the offset results of SALT I came in May 1971, when an agreement was reached over ABM systems. Further discussion brought the negotiations to an end in Moscow in 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the
Interim Agreement Between the Us and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.^[5]

The two sides also agreed to a number of basic principles regarding advisable acquit. Each recognized the sovereignty of the other; agreed to the principle of noninterference; and sought to promote economic, scientific, and cultural ties of mutual benefit and enrichment.^{[half dozen]
[7]
[8]}

Nixon was proud that his diplomatic skills fabricated him attain an agreement that his predecessors had been unable to reach. Nixon and Kissinger planned to link artillery command to détente and to the resolution of other urgent problems through what Nixon called “linkage”. David Tal argues:

The linkage between strategic arms limitations and outstanding issues such as the Heart Due east, Berlin and, foremost, Vietnam thus became central to Nixon’southward and Kissinger’s policy of détente. Through employment of linkage, they hoped to modify the nature and class of U.S. foreign policy, including U.Due south. nuclear disarmament and arms control policy, and to carve up them from those practiced by Nixon’s predecessors. They also intended, through linkage, to make U.South. arms control policy part of détente. […] His policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because information technology was based on flawed assumptions and fake bounds, the foremost of which was that the Soviet Union wanted strategic artillery limitation agreement much more than the United States did.^[ix]

The agreement paved the way for farther give-and-take regarding international cooperation and a limitation of nuclear armaments, as seen through both the SALT II Treaty and the Washington Pinnacle of 1973.

SALT II Treaty

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SALT 2 was a series of talks between American and Soviet negotiators from 1972 to 1979 that sought to curtail the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons. It was a continuation of the Table salt I talks and was led by representatives from both countries. Information technology was the offset nuclear artillery treaty to assume existent reductions in strategic forces to ii,250 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides.

The Common salt Two Treaty banned new missile programs, defined as those with whatever fundamental parameter five% ameliorate than in currently-employed missiles. That forced both sides to limit their new strategic missile types development and structure, such as the development of additional fixed ICBM launchers. Likewise, the agreement would limit the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles and long range missiles to ane,320.^[10]
However, the U.s.a. preserved its most essential programs like the Trident missile, along with the prowl missiles President Jimmy Carter wished to utilise as his main defensive weapon as they were besides slow to have first strike capability. In return, the Soviets could exclusively retain 308 of its so-called “heavy ICBM” launchers of the SS-18 type.

A major breakthrough for the agreement occurred at the Vladivostok Summit meeting in November 1974, when President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev came to an agreement on the basic framework for the Salt 2 agreement. The elements of the agreement were stated to be in effect until 1985.

An understanding to limit strategic launchers was reached in Vienna on June 18, 1979, and was signed past Brezhnev and Carter at a ceremony held in the Redoutensaal of the Hofburg Palace.^[11]

Vi months after the signing, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and in September, the United States discovered that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Republic of cuba.^[12]
Although Carter claimed that the Soviet brigade had been deployed to Cuba only recently, the unit had been stationed on the island since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.^[xiii]
In lite of those developments, Carter withdrew the treaty from consideration in January 1980, and the United states Senate never consented to ratification although terms were honored by both sides until 1986.^[14]

SALT II was superseded by First I in 1991.^[15]

See also

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• Comprehensive Examination Ban Treaty
• Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
• Nuclear Not-Proliferation Treaty
• START
• New Beginning
• Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Citations

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General and cited sources

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• Ambrose, Matthew,
  The Control Agenda: A History of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
  (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Academy Press, 2018). [1]
• Burr, William (ed.),
  The Underground History of The ABM Treaty, 1969-1972, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 60, The National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., eight Nov 2001, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB60/index.html
• Calvo-Goller Karin and Calvo Michel,
  The SALT AGREEMENTS: Content, Application, Verification, Brill, 1987, 428 p,
  [2]
  at Google Books
• Clearwater, John Murray,
  Johnson, McNamara, and the Birth of SALT and the ABM Treaty, 1963-1969
  (Dissertation.Com, 1999) ISBN 978-1581120622
• Garthoff, Raymond L., “Negotiating SALT,”
  Wilson Quarterly, vol. ane, no. 5, Fall 1977, pp. 76–85, JSTOR 40255284
• Garthoff, Raymond Fifty.,
  Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. pgs. 146-223
• Haslam, Jonathan and Theresa Osborne,
  SALT I: The Limitations of Arms Negotiations. U.S.-Soviet Talks Leading to the Acting Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 1969-1972, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Plant for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1987
• Mahan, Erin R. and Edward C. Keefer (eds.),
  Foreign Relations of the The states, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972
  (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Authorities Printing Office, 2010),
• Newhouse, John,
  Common cold Dawn: The Story of SALT
  (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973)
• Payne, Samuel B.
  The Soviet Matrimony and SALT
  (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980)
• Savel’yev, Alexander’ M. and Nikolay N. Detinov,
  The Big Five: Artillery Control Conclusion-Making in the Soviet Spousal relationship
  (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995)
• Smart, Ian. “The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.”
  The World Today, vol. 26, no. 7, 1970, pp. 296–305. JSTOR 40394395
• Smith, Gerard C.,
  Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I by the Main American Negotiator
  (New York: Doubleday, 1980)
• Smith, Gerard C.,
  Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator
  (Toronto, Ontario: Madison Books, 1996)
• Tal, David. ” ‘Absolutes’ and ‘Stages’ in the Making and Application of Nixon’south SALT Policy.”
  Diplomatic History
  37.5 (2013): 1090-1116.
• Tal, David,
  US Strategic Artillery Policy in the Cold War: Negotiation and Confrontation over Common salt, 1969-1979
  (New York: Routledge, 2017). [3]
• Talbott, Strobe,
  Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt Two
  (New York: Harpercollins, 1979) online

External links

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• Text of Salt I
• Text of SALT II
• Text of SALT 2 (cont.)
• Text of the treaty from the U.S. Department of State
• NuclearFiles.org Text of SALT 2 1979
• “U.S.-Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arms Control”,
  Arms Control Today, June 2002.
• Soviet Violations from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Diplomacy Digital Archives